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Introduction: stability and reform in public management
Some Pacific Island governments struggle 
to provide peace and social stability or 
deliver essential services to their citizens. 
This is clearly not the case in Samoa. By 
any standards, Samoa is a peaceful and 
orderly society and the Samoan government 
is competently delivering a wide range of 
basic services to Samoans throughout the 
country. It isn’t perfect: there are service gaps 
and inefficiencies, rumours of corruption, 
and vigorous debates amongst Samoans 
themselves about the quality and probity of 
their government. But Samoa is frequently 
cited as an example of how the government 
of a small island state with limited resources 
can maintain harmony and good service for 
its citizens.
Many Samoans would attribute this stability to the unique 
balance of  custom and written law in their constitution, 
founded on fa’asamoa. In this system, villages are governed 
by fono (village councils of  matai, or chiefs) under fa’amatai, 
the system of  chiefly authority. Very much like any other 
democracy, the elected government in Apia, with a strong 
Westminster base, makes laws, enforces law and order 
nationally, collects taxes and provides public services. The 
two systems are connected politically by the electoral process 
and the written law. First, although (since 1990) Samoans 
have had universal adult suffrage, only matai can stand for 
election. Second, the written law allocates roles and power 
between government and fono. 
In the mid-1990s, following a prolonged episode of  
economic and fiscal crisis, and concerns about accountability 
in the public sector, the government of  Samoa embarked 
on a wide-ranging programme of  public sector reform. 
The reforms included: economic and fiscal policy changes; 
financial market liberalisation; corporatisation and 
privatisation of  government trading enterprises; and changes 
to management of  the core public sector.
The core public sector reforms focused on reduction in 
the size of  the public service; restructuring of  ministries and 
departments; management decentralisation; development of  
government budgeting and accounting; and strengthening 
government-wide and departmental strategy and planning. 
A Public Service Commission paper in 2006 spoke of  a ‘shift 
in principal role of  government from a service provider to 
a regulator, policy maker and service facilitator through 
involvement of  the private sector and community in service 
delivery’ (Public Service Commission (Samoa), 2006a). The 
core public service shrank from 5,621 in 1998 to 4,541 in 
2004 (ibid). Government organisations have been reduced 
from 26 departments to 14 ministries and five constitutional 
offices. Heads of  government departments were restyled 
chief  executive officers and placed on term contracts. 
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Management structures were flattened. The government 
adopted output budgeting and a system of  forward estimates. 
Departmental corporate plans and management plans were 
linked to high-level government policy objectives in the 
Strategy for the Development of  Samoa (SDS) (Government 
of  Samoa, 2005). 
The design of  the public management reforms was 
strongly influenced by the advice the government took from 
Australian and New Zealand consultants. But although 
the architecture of  financial management and public 
administration imported managerialist ideas from Australia 
and New Zealand, the Samoan changes did not go as far on 
decentralisation. Important controls are still centrally held. 
The Ministry of  Finance retains the power of  pre-audit of  
expenditure and officials clearly have concerns about the 
capability of  lower-level staff  to manage budgets. Early 
delegation of  some aspects of  personnel management to 
chief  executive officers was withdrawn, and a ‘proper and 
effective check and balance system has been put in place 
to avoid misuse of  powers and bribery in the public sector’ 
(Public Service Commission (Samoa), 2006a, p.6).
Reform evaluations: efficiency and 
effectiveness
Early appraisals were approving. In 2000 
an Asian Development Bank review team 
(Asian Development Bank, 2000) concluded, 
among other things, that benefits flowed 
from setting of  outputs and performance 
measures, increased emphasis on strategic 
planning and community consultation and 
provision of  increased autonomy and incentives for agencies, 
and the ex-ante agreement of  outputs and measures with 
ministers. More recently there have been fiscal problems 
arising from big public service salary increases and the cost 
of  the Pacific Games to be held in Apia in August 2008. 
Government operating expenses have been rising rapidly. 
The government has accordingly been unable to avoid crisis 
responses to budget blowouts, such as last year’s 30% cut in 
operating budgets, although these reductions were largely 
reversed in the supplementary estimates. The fiscal deficit is 
also growing, mitigated by buoyant revenues.
While the language of  planning and results seems to have 
taken root in the senior public service, there appears to be 
a gap between the formality and the reality. The corporate 
plans themselves are built strongly around results, and the 
estimates have been comprehensively restructured around 
outputs. Senior managers also talked of  the advantages 
of  integrating departmental tasks with national policy 
objectives through a corporate planning approach. But 
while devolution to ministries was supposed to lead to better 
management, results-based management is proving difficult. 
Some ministries and agencies deal better than others with 
the concept of  outputs and performance measures. The 
estimates contain large numbers of  output measures of  
marginal value in assessing the government’s performance. 
The Ministry of  Finance itself  admitted that in some aspects 
it was ‘struggling’ with the new approach: when budgets have 
to be reduced, ministry staff  think in terms of  cutting inputs, 
such as by blanket reductions in operating costs, rather than 
selective reduction in lower-priority outputs. Performance 
management by results was also difficult. Key performance 
indicators for chief  executive officers have been in place only 
for the last three–four years; CEOs have difficulty getting 
their ministers interested in them.
The moot point in all this change is its effect on the quality 
of  outcomes for Samoans. The Public Service Commission 
concludes, cautiously, that the ‘real impact of  delivery 
of  services at the community and village level of  these 
reforms is difficult to assess currently, given the challenges 
of  implementing appropriate and robust monitoring and 
evaluating systems’ (Public Service Commission (Samoa), 
2006b). Several public servants we spoke to agreed that 
improved service delivery to communities and villages was 
a priority, but it would probably be difficult to demonstrate 
significant improvements in outcomes. There are concerns at 
Cabinet level about quality of  service in some key areas. 
Not surprisingly, the machinery and system changes in 
Apia have not made a huge impact on the consciousness 
of  the average Samoan villager, who tends to judge what 
government does by changes in the services received at 
village level. An Asian Development Bank survey (Asian 
Development Bank, 2002) provides some evidence on 
what matters to Samoans about services. For children, lack 
of  education and health support was ‘the overwhelming 
concern among communities consulted’; for youth, it was 
lack of  jobs and appropriate schooling; for women it was lack 
of  education, jobs and cash (although ‘the women consulted 
believe their overall situation has improved, mainly due to 
increased access to education and consequently, improved 
job opportunities’). Specifically, on problems with service 
delivery, people mentioned lack of  accessible and clean 
water, poor or deteriorating access to transport, limited or 
distant health facilities, problems with market access, poor 
school facilities and expensive communications.
In mid-2007 we conducted a series of  interviews in a 
sample of  eight villages on perceptions of  service changes in 
three main areas: primary education, health and agricultural 
extension. Villagers gave a mixed report on these services:
• In primary education, the majority of  villages reported 
better performance from their schools in recent years, 
which they attributed to improvements in the quality of  
teachers and the leadership of  school principals. Several 
Samoan villager[s] ... tend to judge what 
government does by changes in the services 
received at village level.
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said that better facilities had made life easier for teachers, 
and one said that they had encouraged a return of  children 
to the local school. The main concern, particularly for the 
remoter villages, was to maintain rolls and attract and retain 
teachers sufficient to ensure the viability of  the school. 
• Villagers had varying perceptions about whether health 
services were changing for better or worse. Some 
villages had no complaints, and the majority particularly 
mentioned the value to the village of  education on family 
planning, healthy living and sanitation. On the other 
hand, several said that district nurses and other health 
workers visit less often, so that people have to travel to 
a district hospital to get medicines, see a doctor or get 
immunisation shots for their children. 
• There was a higher level of  criticism of  the Ministry of  
Agriculture than of  the other ministries. As far as many 
villagers are concerned, the ministry has not responded 
effectively to the many problems faced by Samoan 
farmers in the last two decades. Comments included 
poor communication, infrequent visits, failure to consult, 
inequity in provision of  services and assistance, and 
suggestions of  personal dishonesty.
Not all of  these developments can be attributed to the 
public management reforms. In particular, since 1990 Samoan 
agriculture has had to contend with three hurricanes and 
some plant diseases and pests which have had serious effects 
on production, together with continued declining demand 
for traditional exports such as copra – problems which would 
have extended any government and its officials. Generally, 
smallholder farming seems like a sector in decline, and not 
an attractive option for young village men and women. In 
social services, the government also faces severe problems in 
recruiting and retaining education and health professionals 
in the face of  the magnetic pull of  emigration – economic 
forces that the government has little control over. Health 
also faces the worldwide problem of  rising costs of  medical 
technology and a local epidemic of  diabetes. On the other 
hand, downsizing and restructuring appear to have had 
adverse effects on local services and the focus on corporate 
planning and output budgeting has yet to produce many 
tangible results in terms of  improved service delivery. 
The effects of  restructuring have been uneven. The 
Ministry of  Education seems to have come through more 
or less unscathed. On the other hand, the health sector is 
still regrouping after a major reorganisation which split the 
Ministry of  Health into three parts: a ministry reduced to 
policy, regulatory and public health functions; a National 
Health Service (NHS), which has taken over most clinical 
services; and the Samoa Kidney Foundation, responsible for 
renal dialysis and kidney treatment. Senior staff  of  the new 
Ministry of  Health have lost significant operational roles and 
obviously feel they have been relegated to the sidelines.
New planning and budgeting processes also seem so far 
to be focused on internal processes rather than improved 
service delivery. Ministry of  Education officials said that 
in developing school plans, teachers preferred targets that 
were easily assessable and depended solely on the school 
committee, like a new classroom or a school fence, rather 
than things that the committee is responsible for but reflect 
on teachers’ performance: for example, children’s reading 
or parents checking homework. A senior Ministry of  
Agriculture manager said that the management reforms had 
‘jolted us back into reality’, the system had ‘made us more 
accountable’, but senior managers confirmed that reforms 
had so far focused more on internal efficiency than on 
improving service delivery. 
The service delivery triangle
The interesting questions about Samoan public services 
centre around whether the way services are delivered are 
affected by the unique elements of  Samoan governance, and 
particularly the relationship between the political authority 
of  executive government, the administrative role of  the 
public service and the autonomy of  village governance under 
fa’amatai.
Along with the World Bank in its 2004 World Development 
Report (World Bank, 2003), we postulate a triangular relationship 
in public service delivery between governments, their citizens 
and service providers. In this triangle, governments authorise 
and fund the provision of  services; front-line organisations – 
public or otherwise – deliver services to citizens; and citizens 
give feedback on the services they receive. 
Figure 1: Samoa – service delivery triangle
In the traditional bureaucratic model, the relationship goes 
clockwise around the triangle. The main job of  governments 
is to decide what services are to be produced and then direct 
government ministries to provide them and monitor their 
performance; the main job of  ministries is to deliver the 
services in compliance with government directives; and the 
main resource of  citizens is to register their satisfaction or 
otherwise by talking to the government directly or through 
the ballot box. In this model, the citizen is recipient rather 
than producer, possibilities of  exit are limited, and voice 
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is exercised through the political accountability of  the 
government to its citizens. 
The triangular relationship, however, implies that the 
provider doesn’t have to be a bureaucrat; by separating the 
government’s funding-authorising role from its provider 
role, it assumes that users might acquire services from 
the private sector or NGOs or from competing public 
providers, or could opt to provide services for themselves. In 
a participatory model, it can imply also that providers have 
a direct relationship with users in planning and delivering 
services. Finally, it leaves open the possibility that citizens 
have both ‘voice’ and ‘exit’ (in the famous definitions of  
Hirschman, 1970). That is, that they have several strategies 
for seeking improvement in services if  there is a gap between 
their expectations and actual outcomes:
• voice: they may make suggestions or complain directly 
to service providers, as well as telling ‘authorisers’: their 
MPs or government officials;
• exit: they may be able to get services from NGOs, their 
church or private providers, or they might provide services 
for themselves through the village or their families.
Written law and customary authority
Samoan custom, culture and traditional 
authority introduce complexities into this 
service relationship. In the usual Western 
model of  public policy, the unit of  account 
is the individual as both service user 
and citizen, able to exercise choice and 
voice, the inheritor of  a set of  rights and 
duties arising from the social contract. 
But how much should this Western ideal 
of  citizenship be modified by peculiarly 
Samoan institutions? In particular, how 
do we modify ideas of  voice and exit if  
most citizen–government relationships are 
mediated through fa’amatai? 
Samoan commentators clearly see the relationship 
between government and the villages as critical to an 
understanding of  Samoan political economy. Colonial 
administrators sought to bypass, co-opt or eliminate chiefly 
authority, which led to rebellion and eventual bloodshed. 
The constitution of  independent Samoa is founded on 
fa’amatai, and the nation’s post-colonial history has been one 
of  constant debate about the relationship between written 
legal authority and the authority of  custom. Throughout this 
discourse are landmark clashes between the principles of  the 
two worlds, and the boundary remains contested territory, 
particularly in the areas of  customary land and human rights 
(Va’a, 2000). The PSC’s public sector plan asserts that:
The relationship between these two levels of  government 
is increasingly conflicting and impacting negatively on 
national development. Unless this interface is clarified and 
strengthened, development at the grass-roots level will not 
be realised. (Public Service Commission (Samoa), 2006b)
Beyond the electoral provisions which provide the basic 
drivers of  the political relationship between the government 
and the villages, several key pieces of  legislation govern the 
legal relationship: the most important are the Lands and 
Titles Act, the Village Fono Act and the Internal Affairs 
Act. The Village Fono Act provides the legal framework for 
village self-governance, including the appointment by the 
Fono of  School and Women’s Committees discussed below; 
the Internal Affairs Act 1995 defines the office of  pulenu’u2 
(loosely and not very accurately translated as mayor)3 and 
this official’s powers and duties. 
The office of  pulenu’u was invented by the German 
colonial administrators as an arm of  their authority in the 
villages, and has survived the New Zealand colonial period 
into the era of  Samoan independence. Legally the pulenu’u 
are appointed by the government, but customarily on the 
recommendation or at least with the assent of  the fono. Their 
duties (modest) and powers (very limited) are defined by the 
1995 act4 They are regarded in the villages as one channel 
for conveying requests or complaints to the government, and 
in turn the Mayors’ Office calls them to Apia on a monthly 
basis to report on village affairs and to return with messages 
on government policy. 
The government is trying to strengthen the role of  the 
office. The Public Service Commission’s public sector plan 
contains a number of  measures designed to strengthen the 
accountability of  the pulenu’u and their capacity to perform 
their administrative functions. But in the political balance 
between Apia and the villages, it seems clear that the pulenu’u 
remain middlemen of  varying administrative ability, largely 
depending for their effectiveness on their status in the 
customary village hierarchy.
Two village committees are important for relations on 
service delivery: the women’s committee and the school 
committee. Both are interesting fusions of  law and custom. 
They have a legal identity but also carry customary authority, 
although in different ways. The women’s committees began 
as a partnership in the 1930s between the Department of  
Health and the villages on public health, over time ‘came to 
play a central role in every village development activity and 
were considered to be traditional groups’ (Fairbairn-Dunlop, 
2000, p.104), and can therefore claim to have a customary 
status in their own right. The school committee is appointed 
by, and more clearly subordinate to, the fono. 
But in the political balance between Apia and 
the villages, it seems clear that the pulenu’u 
remain middlemen of varying administrative 
ability, largely depending for their effectiveness 
on their status in the customary village 
hierarchy.
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In primary education, the Ministry of  Education is 
responsible for teachers and their training; curriculum, 
textbooks and other educational materials; and electricity and 
telephone for government schools. Schools are built on land 
provided by the villages. Donor agencies play a large role in 
funding school buildings and other facilities and equipment, 
including computers. Villages provide, furnish and maintain 
the school buildings; provide housing for teachers; pay some 
operating expenses; contribute voluntary labour; and levy 
school fees on families with school-age children. They also 
enforce school attendance: fono may fine families money or 
food if  their children do not attend school. The focus for 
this activity is the village school committee appointed by the 
fono. The only government requirement is that the school 
principal should be on the committee. 
Life for school committees has traditionally been 
dominated by the relatively mundane problems of  school 
upkeep. A school management project has revised existing 
procedures in an effort to broaden the relationship between 
government and communities. School committees are 
supposed to sign a school agreement that commits the village 
to specific responsibilities. A baseline survey marked each 
school against a checklist as a basis for a school improvement 
plan. According to the ministry, however, sometimes it was 
a struggle to get the plan to focus on gaps related directly 
to children’s learning, such as the variable performance of  
schools in establishing reading programmes. 
How well equipped the school committees are to play the 
larger role envisaged by the ministry probably depends mostly 
on the qualities of  the committee members. As a ministry 
official put it, ‘if  you get top guns it works: parents look up 
to them’. The school committees in the two Apia villages 
where we interviewed were well supplied with professional 
parents who took an active interest in the quality of  learning 
at the school and knew who to contact in the ministry or in 
the government for assistance or funding. In other villages, 
in contrast, the members appointed by the fono carried little 
status. Membership could also change frequently, so that 
the ministry and teachers are dealing with inexperienced 
committees. Some principals keep school committees in the 
dark, or the committees deferred to the principals. 
In health, the official view from the National Health 
Service is that villages can and should be playing a more 
active role in taking responsibility for their own health. 
Traditionally, one official said, ‘we always thought we knew 
best’; the community should be given authority. Other 
facilities should be owned and operated by communities. 
Women’s representatives needed to develop the roles of  
women in the health of  children and care of  the elderly. 
Samoan villages have indeed played a large role in 
public health programmes since the 1930s. The village role 
in health services is generally the responsibility of  women’s 
committees, whose members are appointed by the fono. In 
villages where district hospitals are located the committees 
also carry responsibilities for the general cleanliness of  
the hospital and its environs and housing and feeding the 
medical staff. In return, they generally charge fees to patients 
and their families. 
The villages we spoke to were generally confident in 
their ability to organise and maintain a variety of  health 
programmes through their fono and women’s committees. 
There was evidence of  the strong social control function in 
Samoan villages being turned to the cause of  public health. 
Several villages spoke proudly of  the role of  a strong village 
council and women’s committee in maintaining standards. 
Several mentioned the role of  the women’s committee 
in monitoring sanitary standards – rubbish 
disposal and cleanliness of  cooking areas, 
for example. Villages run competitions to 
encourage high standards. Women’s committee 
representatives can also impose fines on 
households that fail inspection.
Several villages said that if  the government 
withdrew further from providing services they 
could and would organise provision themselves. 
They took up now where the Ministry of  
Health left off, running their own health education and 
healthy living programmes. A couple mentioned that, with 
training from the ministry, they were distributing filiarisis 
medication themselves. Two villages said that, with some 
training for local women, they could provide basic clinical 
services and dispense medicines from the village. 
Any discussion of  agricultural services to villages has to 
take into account the natural calamities visited on the sector, 
but it also appears that in looking for options to declining 
traditional exports the government’s strategy has focused 
on development of  commercial alternatives. Research and 
extension services to support traditional Samoan village 
farming – growing for the kitchen with some surplus to sell 
in local markets – may therefore have taken second place 
to commercial and semi-commercial farming and the 
development of  forestry and fishing. 
The current Strategy for the Development of  Samoa, 
however, somewhat redresses the balance towards 
smallholders. Food security for local consumption – a slogan 
clearly directed at the villages - has become a ‘priority area’, 
aimed at introducing new activities such as fish farming and 
beekeeping as well as new crops, and revitalising traditional 
crops such as taro, coconut and cocoa.5 The SDS and the 
ministry’s Institutional Strengthening Programme (ISP) seek 
to strengthen the ministry’s capabilities in market research, 
biosecurity and research and extension. But the ministry has 
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a lot of  ground to make up with the villages where it has lost 
the position it held through the advisory officers. To restore 
this relationship, the language of  the SDS is participative: 
improved performance ‘will be achieved through strong 
cooperative efforts between the MOA, Ministry of  Women, 
Community and Social Development (MWCSD), village 
councils and the farming community’ (Government of  
Samoa, 2005, p.9).
Villages can support their own agricultural development 
through conservation projects; by encouraging the 
development of  vegetable gardens; attending farming 
demonstrations and competing in produce shows; inspecting 
their plantations themselves; or organising working parties 
for pest and disease control and to maintain access roads. 
Villages also identified services provided by the ministry, 
such as extension services, maintenance and inspection of  
plantation access roads, provision of  farming implements 
and insecticides and pesticides, and supply of  cultivars such 
as coconut and taro seedlings.
Voice
In each of  our three target areas, the 
villages we spoke to were quite clear 
about their ability to complain or make 
representations to the government about 
services, and how they would go about it.
For education matters, most villages 
reported that the school committee would 
raise or discuss any issue first in the fono 
before taking it further. But then the 
committees appeared generally able to raise matters direct 
with the authorities. Most commonly, this was by making 
representations to the Ministry of  Education, but several 
villages said that they would go direct to their member of  
Parliament with a request or complaint. The pulenu’u seem to 
play a relatively minor role in communications on education 
matters: the Mayors’ Office reported that Ministry of  
Education officials commonly go direct to villages without 
checking in with the office.
For health services, all villages said they had had clear 
channels for giving feedback to the government, requesting 
services and making complaints if  they needed to. As well 
as the pulenu’u, recently the government created a position 
of  women’s representative, a member of  the women’s 
committee nominated by the village to represent the village 
on health and other matters. In contrast with education, 
however, villagers said that the pulenu’u plays a role as well 
as the women’s representative or the women’s committee in 
general. 
In agriculture, generally villages felt that they could have a 
say in the services they received, but the feedback was mostly 
delivered through the pulenu’u or sometimes their MP.
Conclusions
On our triangle of  service delivery, the Samoan public sector 
reforms seem to have had most impact on the relationship 
between executive government and its public servants. But 
the picture is mixed. There was support amongst the senior 
managers we spoke to in the line ministries for the greater 
clarity of  objectives and roles brought by the new system, 
particularly in its link to national strategies. On the other 
hand, in Health the reorganisation has left some confusion 
about the respective roles of  the three new organisations. 
There is an impressive system of  financial management, with 
a well-integrated set of  accountability documents and a high 
standard of  reporting, but there have been problems with 
operating deficits and budget blowouts and the objectives of  
decentralised management are not fully realised.
The impact of  the reforms on service delivery as perceived 
from the villages is also at best mixed. The jury is still out 
on the effects of  the reforms, partly because the reforms 
so far have been inward-looking rather than focusing on 
service improvement; and partly because there has been no 
systematic evaluation of  their effects anyway. So our views 
are impressionistic. Of  our three target ministries, Education 
seems to have made the most positive impression because 
of  the direct relationship between ministry officials and the 
village school committees. The picture in Health is clouded 
by the general impression that services have been withdrawn 
from villages into district clinics and hospitals. Agriculture 
has generated more frustration than improvement, probably 
because ministry officials are not as visible in the villages as 
those of  the ministries of  Education and Health.
The current Samoan Development Strategy seems focused 
on redressing the balance between Apia and the villages by 
focusing more on services in the villages. A related issue is the 
apparent government intention to get villages to play a larger 
part in the governance, and possibly provision, of  health and 
education services. Whether the villages have the capacity and 
governance strengths to do that is partly a question of  scale. 
Can ‘modern’ schooling and clinical services be delivered 
at the scale of  a village given the requirements for uniform 
standards of  service, high-cost specialist services backing up 
primary care, training the workforce and equity in provision? 
In fact, for nearly all the important services in their lives 
(electricity, water, roads, communications, schooling, health, 
national security – to say nothing of  dispute resolution), 
villages are mostly in the ‘one-way triangle’ described in our 
diagram. It is the government that decides at a national level 
what services will be provided to villages. Villagers do have 
a partnership role in local service delivery through school 
and women’s committees, but they have a limited ability to 
The answer may turn on the effectiveness of 
that third side of our triangle, where villages 
can exercise their power of voice – through the 
pulenu’u, or to their local MP
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provide services for themselves. The main recourse of  the 
villages, if  they seek more or different services, is to make 
representations to the government.
The answer may turn on the effectiveness of  that third 
side of  our triangle, where villages can exercise their power 
of  voice – through the pulenu’u, or to their local MP – to 
make their views known on the services they receive. And 
maybe that’s quite effective. Why worry about greater local 
governance if  this system seems to satisfy most Samoans?
Finally, though, there is the nagging question of  how 
Samoans see their government. Is it part of  them, there to 
take their orders (in both senses: obey instructions and serve 
up the meal from the services menu), or is it an institution 
over which they have only limited control and which in 
turn controls them: e.g. in land disputes or human rights 
issues, the two most contested areas of  government–village 
relationships? Considering all the paraphernalia of  outputs, 
corporate plans and management speak (not to mention 
restructuring), have the reforms brought public servants closer 
to villages or are they pushing them further away? But there, 
maybe, we also have to remember fa’asamoa and fa’amatai, 
which (for good or for ill as in all families) bind Samoans, 
whether public servant, politician, matai or ordinary villager, 
into a web of  obligations that is the real governance system.
1 The authors would like to acknowledge the support of a grant from the Pacific Cooperation 
Foundation towards the cost of the research for this paper. We also want to record, with 
great appreciation, the assistance provided by three staff of the National University of 
Samoa in interviewing in villages and writing up records of the interviews: Seiuli Vaifou 
Aloalii-Temese, Fiso Eve Faamoe and Naumati Vasa.
2 In the ‘new non-traditional villages’ known as the sui o le mälö (Va’a, 2000).
3 ‘Mayor’ in English usually connotes a locally-elected official, although the equivalent term in 
some other languages may mean a local official appointed by central government.
4 According to Va’a, ‘Pulenu’u are usually unassuming people who mostly keep records of 
village births, deaths and title investiture for the government. Otherwise, they have no other 
special place in the village fono and their status as pulenu’u does not affect their status in 
the village social hierarchy one iota’ (Va’a, 2000, p.167).
5 The emphasis is not exclusively on crops. Other specifically village-focused elements of 
government policy include inshore fisheries management, village-based aquaculture and fish 
nurseries, village forestry initiatives and assistance to farmers with beef cattle production.
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